Jesuit feelings of the people of Asuncion were closely interwoven with their aspirations for local autonomy. The comunero revolts in Paraguay during the seventeentwenties and forties thus meant an intensification of this anti-Jesuit campaign. The revolts to be sure were crushed by the Spanish authorities of Buenos Aires with the assistance of the Jesuit Guarani troops. At the same time the Royal government in Madrid started an investigation into the controversial subject of the Guarani doctrinas. A special observer was sent for that purpose to Rio de la Plata and, later, a Royal committee was formed to scrutinize all available records and to take up testimonies. Finally the verdict came, a Real Cedula of December 28, 1743, which provided a stunning refutation of current rumors and explicitly confirmed the privileges of the Guaranis, in the first place their low tribute. The famous system of collective property and other peculiar internal features also deserved royal approval. This Cedula Grande, as it is usually labelled, meant the heyday of the Jesuit enterprise in Rio de la Plata. In the light of the events that would soon follow, the Spanish-Portuguese border treaty of 1750 and the ensuing, destructive rebellion of some of the Guarani towns and finally the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767-1768, the Cedula Grande seems particularly remarkable. If we should trust contemporary or modern Jesuit or pro-Jesuit authors, the Cedula Grande was simply the result of an outdrawn, thorough and impartial scrutiny 2 . No proofs have been adduced from the other side in the controversy surrounding the "Jesuit State" that it was not. If we take up the subject for study here, it is because we think that the documentation we possess will allow us to place the Cedula Grande in its proper context of organized efforts made by the Jesuit pressure group in Spain. It will shed light on the methods and influence of the Jesuits at work at the Court of the first Spanish Bourbons. It will also illustrate the administrative practices of the time. On the other hand, only further research in Spanish archives may provide the answers to some of the questions that are related to the history of the Cedula Grande.
The principal antecedents of the Cedula are referred to in its first part 3 . A certain Captain Bartolome de Aldunate, stating that the 150,000 (sic!) Indians of the Jesuits did not pay any tribute at all, had suggested to the government in 1726 that they be placed in charge of three Spanish corregidores and that open trade between them and the other inhabitants of the region be allowed. The King asked the acting governor of Paraguay, Martin de Barua, to give his opinion in the matter. In 1730 Barua reported back to Madrid that there were probably not more than 40,000 tributarios in the Guarani towns and that the introduction of corregidores would be difficult because the Indians would resent it. But he thought that the tribute ought to be raised from one peso per capita to two, that is about half of what other Indians in the jurisdiction of Asuncion were liable to pay. Barua finally maintained that even with respect to the tribute agreed upon in 1649, payments had not been made in due order so that the Guaranis were indebted to the Treasury for no less than 3,200,000 pesos. The Council of the Indies first thought of asking Barua to come to Spain to inform at length. Then it decided instead to send a dignitary by the name of Juan Vazquez de Agiiero to Buenos Aires to interview Barua as well as the Jesuit leaders and other knowledgeable peoble. Councillor Antonio Josέ Alvarez de Abreu seems to have been behind this decision 4 . Vazquez's open instructions dealt in the first place with the tribute question. The reserved ones asked him to find about if the Jesuits were violating the rules of the Real Patronato, or other laws. The athmosphere in Madrid was evidently very suspicious of the Jesuits of Paraguay at the time. As the Viceroy of Peru, Marquis Castelfuerte and Governor Bruno de Zavala of Buenos Aires were both of them known to be very pro-Jesuit, the despatch of Vazquez de Agiiero was obviously the logical step to take. The Council realized that the question of tribute was intimately related to that of continued Jesuit control of secular administration in the thirty Guarani towns. Would it be possible to rely on Jesuit assistance in levying a higher tribute, or should the Jesuit role of intermediaries rather be brought to an end? When Jesuit Provincial Jaime Aguilar met with his consultores in March 1738 to discuss Vazquez de Agüero's proposal to base the tribute on the 19,116 figure, one of the Fathers present vigorously opposed even this step towards normalization of the tribute issue. He maintained that the proposal should only be accepted at the express order of the King. His view seems finally to have prevailed 10 .
The recalcitrant Jesuit attitude has to be explained against the backdrop of the rapid diminution of the population in the Guarani towns at this time as a consequence of epidemics. As a matter of fact, the whole "Paraguayan" Province of the Jesuit Order, comprising both missions and colleges in the Rio de la Plata region, was in rather bad shape. Heavy debts had been contracted by the Province in Europe where the great majority of the Jesuits were still being recruited. Many of the Jesuit colleges were also heavily in debt. To great extent, this situation seems to have reflected the overambitious expansion of previous decades. The number of Jesuits in the Province had increased from 238 in 1710 and 274 ten years later to 352 in 1735. Only 106 of these were actually engaged in missionary work 11 .
While Vazquez de Agüero was slowly ending his inquiries in Buenos Aires, another discussion in the same matter took place in Madrid. The Council of the Indies instructed Manuel Martinez Carvajal, Crown Attorney for New Spain and Miguel de Villanueva, Secretary for Peru, to take up the question of the Guarani tribute with Father Gaspar Rodero, Procurator General of the Overseas Provinces of the Order in Madrid. They met in late 1736 or early 1737
12 . When the two deputies criticized the Jesuit attitude with respect to the tribute, Rodero pointed out to them that the Jesuits had asked Vazquez de Agüero to visit the Guarani towns to find out himself about the number of tributarios but that he had refused to do so. The Jesuit representative also presented a long list of services rendered by the Guaranis to the Crown without compensation. This referred to public work as well as military service up to the siege of Colonia do Sacramento, the Portuguese fortress on Rio de la Plata, in 1735 and 1736. Rodero considered these services a justification of the great difference between the one-peso tribute of the Guaranis and the four-or-fivepeso tribute of other Indians. It might be argued, however, that at least the military value of the Guaranis was about to decrease. It is true that one Jesuit chaplain lost his life in the course of the unsuccessful siege of Colonia in 1736, but on the whole, the contribution of the Guarani troops on that occasion was far from being distinguished 18 . Other matters discussed by Rodero and the two official were the exclusion of strangers from the Guarani towns and the collective economy that functioned there. The discussions ended with Martinez Carvajal and Villanueva accepting the arguments put forward by Father Rodero. They reported to the Council that even if the risk were taken of augmenting the Guarani tribute rate of one peso a head, it would be both unfair and inconvenient to equalize their tribute with that of other Indians 14 .
In 1738 Vazquez de Agüero finally left Buenos Aires for Spain. The Jesuits realized that a showdown in the tribute question was approaching. In April the Provincial Congregation chose the two Procurators who as a matter of routine were to be sent to Jesuit headquarters in Rome and to Spain to arrange for the recruitment and sending of new Jesuits to Rio de la Plata and other matters. But in the instructions drawn up by the Provincial for the two Fathers, Diego Garvia and Juan Jose Rico, it was expressly pointed out that this time the "negocio principalisimo" of the Procurators was to defend the Guaranis from being subject to a new and higher tribute 15 . arrived in Spain a few months later. They soon proceeded to Rome to attend the Congregatio Procuratorum at Jesuit headquarters in 1740 1 ·. On his return in Madrid Father Garvia, the more than seventy years old Senior Procurator, concentrated his efforts in obtaining the license required for sending a number of new Jesuits to Rio de la Plata. As the Jesuits were supposed to engage in missionary work when sent to the New World, the license implied that the Crown would then also pay for their travel expenses. Garvia asked for permission to recruit and send sixty-five Jesuits. This was finally conceded by the Council of the Indies in December, 1740 17 . The Senior Procurator then left for Andalusia to take care of the many tasks that were related to the despatch of the new Jesuits leaving his junior colleague, Father Rico, in charge of the business in Madrid. Consequently, Father Rico represented the Jesuits of "Paraguay" during the final stage of the deliberations that produced the Cedula Grande. His account-book which has been preserved, covers the period from October 23, 1741, when Garvia left Madrid, until March 23, 1745 when the Procurators and the new Jesuits finally after a long delay caused by the war against England, left Spain for Rio de la Plata. As far as I know it has not been used as a source with respect to the Cedula Grande 18 .
Juan Jose Rico was born in Flanders in 1687 but his parents were obviously Spaniards. According to one contemporary, young Rico In January, 1742 Father Rico asked the Council of the Indies for a license to send ten missionaries in addition to the sixty-five already conceded to Rio de la Plata on account of the many deaths that had been reported thence since 1738 and because of the need for missionaries to convert the savage Pampas Indians. The report of the Crown Attorney was expressed in very positive and understanding terms and the license was soon conceded. It is obvious that the Crown Attorney, a key official, was in favour of the Jesuits 20 .
According to Father Jose Cardiel, a contemporary, all the documents dealing with the Guaranis and their missionaries were now brought to Madrid from the Archives of Simancas and a special committee was formed to consider the contradictory material 21 . In any case we know that Dionisio Larne, an official of the Council who had been put in charge of presenting the case, started to work on it by March 1742. It was at that time that Father Rico offered him and his clerks the equivalent of 310 pesos as an initial token of encouragement 22 .
In the course of the preparation of the report, Father Rico was also submitted to questioning. In May he paid 22 pesos for the publication of a thirty-six-page Memorandum defending the Jesuit cause 23 . By June and July the business was getting hotter. Father Rico went to the Court in Aranjuez from his Madrid residence. The wife of an anonymous "Senor Ministro" received an appropiate gift. Finally the good Father Rico arranged for solemn masses to be said to assure success in the Guarani affair on the day when the presentation of the case started in the Council 24 . This presentation was a lengthy procedure. It was not over until six months later. On January 10, 1743, the Councillors voted on the issue. The splendid result caused Rico once again to arrange for solemn masses in the chapels of Nuestra Senora del Buen Consejo and Saint Ignace 25 . Jesuit gratitude towards worldly helpers is also reflected in Rico's account-book. In January an anonymous personality "who favored us very much since the beginning of this business" received a gift valued at 360 pesos. Larne's deputy who had attended the voting received 400 pesos whereas Larne himself In providing these candid data from the account-book of the Jesuit Procurator it has not been my intention to show that the Cedula Grande was a result of successful bribes. In the first place, the amounts are probably far too low to warrant such a suspicion. A certain degree of corruption, on the one side bordering on genuine gifts and tokens of friendship, on the other impossible to distinguish from mere tips, existed in practically every administration and Court environment of the time 28 . The absence of such a lubricant would make things even more difficult or impossible to achieve. On the other hand, success usually required far more than bribes. This must anyway have been true in the case of the Cedula Grande.
Nevertheless it might be of interest to notice that Father Rico's gifts, bribes and tips that are obviously related to the Cedula Grande totalled about 2,530 pesos. To this might be added the costs of publication of documents, journeys to the Royal Court and the aforementioned masses which caused about 100 pesos in expenses. Within the budget of the Procurator, mostly destined to the training and subsistence of Jesuits who were to join the "Paraguayan" Province, this did not constitute a very large item. In his account-book, to which we have referred, Father Rico renders an account of expenses totalling 87,574 pesos and lVe real. How such a sum was raised for the purpose and transferred to Europe, in this case partly via Lisbon and in the form of contraband, is an intricate subject into which I cannot go on this occasion 29 .
Before we venture to suggest an analysis of the circumstances mainly responsible for the Cedula Grande, we have to summarize the contents of the famous document or rather that of the consulta of May, 22, 1743 on which it was based 30 . The consulta first relates the development of the Guarani controversy from Aldunate's grievances in 1726 until the reports of Vazquez de Agüero, Martinez Carvajal and Miguel de Villanueva. The recommendations of the Council follow divided into twelve paragraphs. In the first one, the Council recommended that the one-peso tribute should be maintained and the payment based on the figures given to Vazquez de Agüero until a census could be taken. Secondly, the Council approved of the way in which the export of yerba and other trade items of the Guaranis was managed by the Jesuits, until then a frequent source of grievances against the latter. A tone of slight reproach crept into the third paragraph in which the Jesuits were exhorted to maintain schools in their towns and see to it that the Indians learnt Spanish. The peculiar economic system in the Guarani communities, run by the Jesuits, was approved in the fourth paragraph. The fact that the municipal system in these towns was also under Jesuit supervision was likewise approved in the following paragraph of the Council's report. That the Guaranis continued to have firearms and munitions at their disposal raised no objections on the part of the Councillors (sixth paragraph). They only thought that the Jesuit Provincial ought to ponder if some precautions were needed in the unfortunate case of a rebellion. Such a rebellion would in fact occur about ten years later! The seventh paragraph was devoted to the question of tithes. The Guaranis had never paid tithes despite a cedula ordering them to do so in 1694 31 . The Councillors did not insist on immediate payment but rather submitted the question to the good judgment of the Jesuits themselves in the hope that they would voluntarily offer some percentage or amount as tithes in view of the low tribute awarded the Indians. The eighth paragraph confirmed that the frequent reproach that the Jesuits did not undertake any new conversions, was no longer justified. The good spiritual state of the Guaranis, the beauty of their churches and the perfection of the divine service there were applauded in the following paragraphs. In the eleventh, it was observed that the form in which the Jesuits administered the Guarani parishes under the Royal Patronage should be maintained. Finally the question of how the Guarani district should be divided between the governments of Asuncion and of Buenos Aires was touched but without any recommendation being made. An appendix was devoted to the fact that many of the Jesuit missionaries were foreigners, especially Germans. Their loyalty, often questioned by the enemies of the Jesuits, was underlined. But the Fathers were asked to be cautious particularly in the case of natives from "naval powers"
32 . In view of the raging warfare with England this was a natural observation. 34 . On both occasions, for instance, he took up the question of the tithes which he thought should be levied at once. For the author of "Victima Real Legal", an extremely regalist essay, this was the only possible position to take. The Marquis also stated that the Jesuit administration of the properties of the Guaranis violated rules laid down in the Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias. He recommended that the authorities in the Indies should be asked to suggest another solution. Hinting at the vast funds that evidently were at the disposal of the Jesuit Procurators sent to Europe, their perspicacious foe suggested that after all the tribute might as well be raised to two pesos or more. He also wanted to curtail the jurisdiction of the Indian corregidores, obviously the tools of the Jesuits. All his arguments were explicitly rejected by the majority. In the last instance, the majority took the trouble of pointing out that the Marquis relied on one, obviously biased observer 35 .
The King, or should we rather say, the Ministry of the Indies, accepted the advise of the majority and dispatched the cedula without making any essential alterations.. In a final paragraph the King expressed his pleasure that the false calumnies of an Aldunate and a Barua had been revealed and his desire that the Jesuits should carry on their great enterprise with the same zeal and fervor as hitherto had . Rico sent to the Queen "una cajita de madera pintada en forma de ηανίο con la quilla de una esmeralda, y lo demas obra de oro, pendiente una cadena de oro que pesa 2 onzas, 9 adarmes". he had won the goodwill of some humble and probably poorly paid officials. It should, of course, also be kept in mind that at the time most of the Governors and Bishops in Rio de la Plata were favorably disposed towards the Jesuits and kept writing letters to Madrid in this sense. But the importance of this should probably not be overrated 39 . In any case, the combination of well coordinated Jesuit and pro-Jesuit efforts proved too much for a foe like Marques de la Regalia. The antiJesuit camarilla in Madrid would only win its first success some ten years later, when the Jesuits were deprived of the key position of Confessor to the King, which in its turn was the first great step towards the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 40 .
But the obtainment of the Cedula Grande should not be reduced merely to a play of intrigues. Admittedly the very controversial documentation that had piled up with regard to the Guarani community and the whole Jesuit endeavour in Rio de la Plata could lend itself to the most different interpretations. The Crown policy had, in the course of time, vacillated from one extreme to another under the influence of reports received. Furthermore, a coldly objective scrutiny of particularly the tribute issue could hardly have been expected to produce the pro-Jesuit interpretation that it did in 1743. But let us not forget the dramatic events that had occurred in Rio de la Plata during this very period. Whereas Aldunate and Barua had presented their case at a time when the causes and character of the comunero rebellions in Paraguay were still rather obscure, no such doubt existed any longer in the seventeenforties. The memory of the Guarani contribution against the comuneros who had killed a Royal Governor 41 , as well as, favorably presented, their role as a bulwark against the Portuguese were mighty factors in favor of the Jesuit pretensions. The warfare against England that threatened the overseas possessions ever since 1739, must have made military considerations carry much weight. On the other hand, the time was not yet ripe for the aggressive regalism, only foreboded by a Marques de la Regalia, that later on would take another look at questions such as the loyalty of foreign Jesuits, or the temporal administration in the hands of ecclesiastics.
To the Jesuits the Cedula Grande seemed to be the definitive confirmation of the greatness and justice of the controversial, more than hundred year old, enterprise among the Guarani Indians 42 . In the eyes of posterity it has maintained rather much of this quality. But in a strictly chronological sense this favorable verdict remained unchallenged only for a few years, until the Guarani War of the seventeenfifties which witnessed an upsurge of old and new accusations, once again taken seriously in Madrid. And in 1767, the decree of expulsion of all the Jesuits from the dominions of the Spanish King, at least to some small degree provoked by the events in Rio de la Plata, provided the categorical denial of the apology constituted in 1743 by the Cedula Grande.
